Beyond “caution, pragmatism and cynicism”? France’s relations with the Eastern Baltic in times of crisis (1918–1922; 1988–1992) [Kokkuvõte: Kas ainult “ettevaatlikkus, pragmatism ja künism”? Prantsusmaa ja Baltimaade suhted kriisiaastatel (1918–1922; 1988–1992)] by Bergmane, Una & Clerc, Louis
Ajalooline Ajakiri, 2016, 3/4 (157/158), 369–396
369
http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/AA.2016.3-4.03
Beyond “caution, pragmatism 
and cynicism”? France’s 
relations with the Eastern 
Baltic in times of crisis 
(1918–1922; 1988–1992)
Una B ergmane and Louis  Clerc
ABSTRACT
France’s relations with the small states in the Eastern Baltic have been the ob-
ject of studies focusing mostly on geostrategic elements. Seen through that lens, 
France appears to concentrate mostly on supporting Russia as a stabilizing force 
in the Baltic, with little interest in the claims of small states. But there are other 
elements shaping France’s policy towards these small states, elements that this 
article will present and that allow for a more varied view of French policy to-
wards Finland and the Baltic states.
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France’s relations with Eastern Europe have been the object of a long list 
of historical studies, most of which have concentrated on geostrategic ele-
ments linked to the German issue.1 As France was engaged in an existen-
tial struggle with Germany right up to the 1951 Treaty of Paris, it regularly 
looked to Russia or the Soviet Union as a balancing force to guarantee 
imperial stability.2 In this context, small states and national groups were 
1  A few exceptions have worked to also consider other levels of explanation, for example 
Isabelle Davion, Mon voisin, cet ennemi. La France face aux relations polono-tchéco-
slovaques entre les deux guerres (Bruxelles: Peter Lang, 2009); Frédéric Dessberg, Le 
triangle impossible. Les relations franco-soviétiques et le facteur polonais dans les ques-
tions de sécurité en Europe, 1924–1935 (Bruxelles: PIE-Peter Lang, 2009).
2  See Anne Hogenhuis-Seliverstoff, Les relations franco-soviétiques, 1917–1924 (Paris: 
Publications de la Sorbonne, IHRIC, 1981). Three important moments bear witness to 
this tendency: the Franco-Russian alliance between 1893 and 1917, the 1935 Franco-Soviet 
treaty, and the post-1944 contacts between Charles de Gaulle’s government and the Soviet 
Union. At these three moments, the French obviously tried to find a counterbalance to 
Germany in Eastern Europe. 
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seen as potentially destabilizing, and the post-1871 French leadership was 
reluctant to recognize national claims in Eastern Europe.3 In the early 
twentieth century, this reluctance spread from conservative to moderate 
Republican circles – the journalist and thinker Jacques Bainville illustrated 
it well in 1917, denouncing the birth of unreliable little nationalities ready to 
dismantle Eastern Europe’s old imperial structures.4 While some of these 
nationalities were seen as having strong claims to historical legitimacy 
(mostly because they were old partners of France, like Poland), others were 
described as destabilizing accidents of history. Nowhere else is this tradi-
tion as strongly expressed as in Albert Sorel’s influential L’Europe et la rev-
olution française, published between 1885 and 1904, where Sorel portrayed 
France’s ideal foreign policy as one of European stability, and criticized the 
Third Empire’s adventurous support for European national movements.
This uneasiness with Eastern European national claims seems at first 
sight to dominate French policy up to the end of the Cold War. This is 
3  Georges-Henri Soutou, “La France et le problème des nationalités pendant la guerre 
de 1914–1918: le cas de la Serbie”, Balcanica, XLV (2014), 369–398.
4  Nationalities and the right to self-determination constituted for Bainville the facets 
of a “democratic” phenomenon he saw as the principal cause of instability and war in 
Europe (cf. Yaël Dagan, “Jacques Bainville en première guerre mondiale”, Olivier Dard, 
Michel Grunewald, Jacques Bainville, Profils et receptions (Genève: Peter Lang, 2010), 
71-86). For Bainville’s 1913 articles on Polish and Ukrainian “separatisms”: Dominique 
Decherf, Bainville, l’intelligence de l’histoire (Paris: Bartillat, 2000), 126; Jacques Bain-
ville, Les conséquences politiques de la paix (Paris: Arthème Fayard, 1920), 130; Les 
petits États face aux changements culturels, politiques et économiques de 1750 à 1914, 16e 
Congrès international des sciences historiques, Stuttgart, 25 août-1er septembre 1985, ed. 
by Domokos Kosáry  (Lausanne: Faculté de lettres, 1985), 13. Bainville epitomized a rich 
intellectual tradition of contempt towards “small states”, borne out in various contexts 
of concerns for European stability or a rejection of nationalism. Examples of that trend 
can be found in France and Britain, from H. G. Wells (cf. the author’s Anticipations of 
the reaction of mechanical and scientific progress upon human life and thought (London: 
Chapman & Hall, 1902), 260) to E. H. Carr (The 20 years’ crisis, 1919–1939 (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1964), vii), François Delaisi (Franck Théry, Construire l’Europe dans les 
années vingt, l’action de l’Union paneuropéenne sur la scène franco-allemande, 1924–1932 
(Genève: Institut européen, 1998), 54) to Peter Hitchens’ ravings about “annoying mini-
states on the borders of Russia” (“As Ukrainians force Russians to turn their back on 
their language and change their names, I ask, is this the world’s most absurd city?”: 
Mail Online: Peter Hitchen’s blog: <http://hitchensblog.mailonsunday.co.uk/2010/09/
as-ukrainians-force-russians-to-turn-their-back-on-their-language-and-change-their-
names-i-ask-is-th.html> (accessed 20 May 2015). Julien Gueslin gathers a few arguments 
on both sides of the debate concerning small states in his article: “Les petits états dans 
l’Entre-deux-guerres. Un concept en evolution”, Bulletin de l’Institut Pierre Renouvin, 
11 (2001).
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particularly true if one considers small states in the Eastern Baltic,5 as 
pointed out by Latvia’s former Foreign Minister Sandra Kalniete, who in 
2010 described French President François Mitterrand’s attitude towards 
Baltic independence as predominantly “cautious, pragmatic, and cynical”.6 
In 1918 as in 1990, Baltic nationalism appeared to herald the prospect of 
inherently weak and troublesome small nations to the east of Germany.7 
However, in times of momentous change, France could also officially 
recognize and support the states based on those troublesome nationalities. 
Paris recognized Finland in January of 1918, less than a month after the 
country’s declaration of independence, and recognized Latvia and Estonia 
in January of 1921, and Lithuania in December of 1921.8 Aristide Briand’s 
contribution to the recognition of Estonia and Latvia earned him a street 
named in his honour and a memorial plaque, both in Riga. After France’s 
intervention projects in Russia ran their course, the 1920’s saw a stabiliza-
tion of relations with the new Eastern Baltic states, both at the diplomatic 
level and in their image in French society – while Finland was associated 
with Scandinavia, the Baltic nations were reincarnated as promising “lit-
tle Denmarks”. At another point in time, Mitterrand quickly withdrew 
his bet on Gorbachev and became the first Western president to visit the 
newly independent Baltic states in 1992.9 At both points in time, large sec-
tions of French society, the press, political and diplomatic circles agi-
tated on behalf of small, oppressed nationalities. Historical memories, 
5  For the purpose of this article, the Baltic States will be defined as the grouping of 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The text will also consider Finland as well in the context 
of the early 1920’s – as a neighbour to Soviet Russia, Finland was often bunched by the 
French in the same thematic aspects as the three Baltic states (intervention in Russia, 
stabilization of the Eastern Baltic, German influence). 
6  “Piesardzība, pragmatisms un cinisms – tā es raksturotu Miterāna attieksmi pret 
Baltijas valstu neatkarību,” quote in Sandra Kalniete, “Rietumvalstu nostājas maiņa 
Baltijas valstu neatkarības atzīšanas jautājumā”, presentation during the seminar 1990. 
gada 4. maija Latvijas Neatkarības deklarācija: starptautiskie un iekšpolitiskie aspect. 
Riga: Latvian University, 3 May 2010.
7  This can also be observed in the Ukrainian case: Olga Alexandrova, “Ukraine and 
Western Europe”, Harvard Ukrainian Studies, 20 (1996), 145–170. 
8  Cf. Louis Clerc, La Finlande et l’Europe du Nord dans la diplomatie française – rela-
tions bilatérales et intérêt national dans les considérations finlandaises et nordiques 
des diplomates et militaires français, 1917–1940 (Brussels: PIE-Peter Lang, 2011); Julien 
Gueslin, La France et les petits États baltes: réalités baltes, perceptions françaises et ordre 
européen, 1920–1932, Thèse de doctorat en histoire sous la direction du professeur Robert 
Frank (Université Paris I, 2004).
9  Speech by the President of Latvia Vaira Vīķe Freiberga during the Seminar on Baltic 
Integration in the EU, Paris, October 2, 2002: Latvijas Valsts prezidents, <http://www.
president.lv/pk/content/?art_id=1439> (accessed 20 August 2016).
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representations, cultural values or the vagaries of domestic politics were 
allowed to interfere with the iron logic of geopolitics. 
This article aims to make sense of these contradictory policy dilemmas 
by exploring various levels in French decision-making linked to Finland and 
the Baltic states at two critical junctures in time. Besides the cases under 
study, the methodological point this article would like to make concerns 
the necessity of observing decision-making as a mix of geostrategic consid-
erations and the workings of complex societies.10 Both of the moments we 
will study (Finland’s and the Baltic states’ independence in 1918; the Bal-
tic states’ reacquisition of independence in 1988–92) are situations where 
structural constraints relax, the range of choices suddenly expands, new 
actors emerge, and structures are allowed to evolve.11 Both allow us to look 
at long-term developments (in this case mostly long-term geopolitical con-
straints on France’s Baltic considerations) and consider possible new ele-
ments shaping French reactions. Set in a longer chronological frame, these 
two points of comparison might provide ways of nuancing the idea of an 
instinct for stability in French diplomacy: if the logic of Franco-Russian 
relations and French conservative instincts served as strong incentives for 
France to take action,12 our study would also like to emphazise the inter-
national context framing France’s policy options, and, in the meanders of 
France’s domestic policy, the role of networks, contacts, personalities, val-
ues, representations and historical memory.13 
10  Studying the United States’ relations with Finland, Michael Berry has already noted 
that there would be no reason at all to study the foreign policies of small states if geogra-
phy and the politics of Great Powers alone actually determined the fate of international 
relations: Michael R. Berry, American foreign policy and the Finnish exception, ideological 
preferences and wartime realities (Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 1987), 375. 
11  Giovanni Capoccia, R. Daniel Kelemen, “The study of critical junctures: theory, nar-
rative, and counterfactuals in historical institutionalism”, World Politics, 59:3 (2007), 
341–369. 
12  Cf. Georges-Henri Soutou, “La France face aux crises des périphéries européennes 
aux XIXe et XXe siècles: une grande puissance en retrait”, La France face aux crises et 
aux conflits des périphéries européennes et atlantiques du XVIIe au XXe siècle, ed. by Eric 
Schnakenbourg and Frédéric Dessberg (Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2010), 47–56. 
13  This article draws on a general conception of foreign policy as the product of cal-
culations and decisions rooted in international and domestic contexts, not unlike 
Graham T. Allison’s Foreign Policy Analysis as summarized in Politique étrangère, 
nouveaux regards, ed. by Frédéric Charillon (Paris: Presses de la FNSP, 2002), 33–64. 
But the main theoretical and methodological environment of this work is the body of 
reflections organized around Pierre Renouvin’s and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle’s school 
of International History. This methodology, in a general framework consisting of 
states and decision-making organizations, allows foreign policy decision-making to 
be considered as the result of both deeply rooted structures and the interpretations of 
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International relations as a frame for France’s actions
Two important elements of France’s relations with nations in the Eastern 
Baltic in 1917–20 were on the one hand the competition with Germany, and 
on the other hand the debates over nationalities and self-determination. 
60 years later though, the Cold War’s bipolarity and European integration 
were the main structures affecting policy. France itself, as an international 
actor, was a different nation in the early 1920s and in the late 1980s. 
Following the truce of November 1918, most French really did see their 
country as both the main victor and the main victim of the war. As com-
pensation for its war efforts, and as a guarantee of its security, France con-
sidered it an urgent necessity to expand its influence in Europe – espe-
cially in regions where Germany had been dominant or where France had 
mostly played the role of a distant mediator,14 such as Eastern Europe and 
the Baltic Sea.15 Before the war, those regions had mostly been peripheral 
to France’s vision of its immediate strategic interests,16 but they suddenly 
came into focus as victory on the Western Front brought governmental 
leaders, intellectuals, and businessmen to believe in new possibilities for 
these structures by various actors, official and non-official. As this method is above 
all a method of historical studies, it allows the researcher to factor in the fickleness of 
historical events and the role of random interactions. For the latest reflections in this 
field, cf. Pour l’histoire des relations internationales, ed. by Robert Frank (Paris: PUF, 
2012). Going in the same direction, and conveniently written in a language correspond-
ing to the unwritten norms of current academic debates: T. G. Otte, “Diplomacy and 
decision-making”, Palgrave advances in international history, ed. by Patrick Finney 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 36–51.
14  Cf. Xavier Fraudet, Politique étrangère française en mer Baltique, 1871–1914, Acta 
Universitatis Stockholmiensis 77 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 2005), 
240–255. 
15  France was concerned not only by Germany’s influence but also by that of Britain. 
Abdil Bicer, for example, draws an interesting portrait of the subdued rivalry between 
France and Britain in the Ottoman Empire immediately after the Armistice: Abdil Bicer, 
“Le service de renseignement, outil de la politique orientale de la France au lendemain 
de la Grande Guerre”, Revue Historique des Armées, 3 (2003), 77–89. 
16  Economically but also politically, the Baltic region remained a periphery of France’s 
diplomacy between 1900 and 1918. France’s competitors dominated the region, and it 
was little known in Paris. Here France acted mostly as a distant – if at times active – 
mediator. Cf. La position internationale de la France: aspects économiques et financiers, 
XIXe–XXe
 
siècles, ed. by Maurice Levy-Leboyer (Paris: Éditions de l’EHESS, 1995), 43–45; 
Louis Clerc, “Un médiateur lointain. La diplomatie française et les États nordiques 
(1900–1940)”, Les horizons de la politique extérieure française, Stratégie diplomatique 
et militaire dans les régions périphériques et les espaces seconds (XVIe–XXe siècles), ed. 
by Frédéric Dessberg and Eric Schakenbourg (Bruxelles: PIE Peter Lang, 2011), 313–326.
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expanding France’s influence.17 Methods were conceived in the context of 
the options available to France and what was acceptable in the early twen-
tieth century: cultural influence was important, but direct intervention 
in the economic, military, and diplomatic sense was clearly envisaged.18 
Goods and alliances were supposed to follow the flag, a general approach 
strengthened by four years of war and the development of France’s armed 
forces as integral parts of foreign policy decision-making.19 Security was 
seen as resting on a mixture of military might, economic preponderance, 
and strong alliances. But France in 1918, for all its glory, was also a weak-
ened and indebted nation: lack of resources and a general state of exhaus-
tion found their expression only a few months after November of 1918 in 
the National Assembly’s budgetary discussions.20 France had to tighten its 
belt, and the 1919 Paris Peace Conference was a long exercise in compromise 
for French leaders constrained by the influence of allies and creditors.21 
France’s action was also marked by discussions on the “national ques-
tion” and more specifically small nationalities in Eastern Europe. In Janu-
ary of 1918, US president Woodrow Wilson clearly spelled out his goals for 
the post-war world, including in them the restoration of Poland as a state 
and some consideration for the claims of Eastern European nationalities. 
This US attempt to shape the debate on peace terms found only lukewarm 
support in France.22 On the specific issue of nationalities, French diplo-
mats were not entirely convinced that European equilibria and the suscep-
tibilities of imperial powers could be so easily gambled with, even in the 
17  For instance, Histoire économique et sociale de la France, tome IV, vol. 2 (Paris: PUF, 
1980), 730.
18  Kalervo Hovi, “The Baltic states and the French economy in the 1920s”, Emancipa-
tion and interdependence: the Baltic states as new entities in the international economy, 
1918–1940, ed. by Anders Johansson, Kārlis Kangeris, Alexander Loit and Sven Nord-
lund, Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis, Studia Baltica Stockholmiensia, 13 (Uppsala, 
1994), 35–39.
19  Cf. Bâtir une nouvelle sécurité – La coopération militaire entre la France et les États 
d’Europe centrale et orientale de 1919 à 1929 (Paris: CEHD/SHAT, 2001). 
20  Hogenhuis-Seliverstoff, Les relations franco-soviétiques, 111, 132–140.
21  Cf. David Stevenson, French war aims against Germany, 1914–1919 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1986); Peter Jackson, “Politics, culture, and the security of France: a reinterpreta-
tion of French foreign and security policy after the First World War”, French Historical 
Studies, 34:4 (2011), 577–610. 
22  Georges-Henri Soutou especially underlines the reluctance of the diplomat Philippe 
Berthelot, the main architect of France’s answer to Wilson’s 14 points: Georges-Henri 
Soutou, Ghislain de Castelbajac, Sébastion de Gasquet, Recherches sur la France et le 
problème des nationalités pendant la première guerre mondiale (Pologne, Lithuanie, 
Ukraine) (Paris: Presses de la Sorbonne, 1995). 
375Bergmane, Clerc: France’s relations with the Eastern Baltic
case of Poland.23 But France did not distance itself from the emergence of 
a “juridical internationalist” conception of international relations, which 
was about to reach maturity in the context of the 1920s and the League 
of Nations.24 For some French publicists and politicians, the liberation of 
“oppressed nationalities” was a question of principle already in 1917: person-
alities from the republican moderate Left with an interest in international 
affairs and foreign cultures (Henry Franklin-Bouillon, Albert Thomas, 
Léon Bourgeois, etc.) defended small European nationalities in the name 
of justice but also out of a conception of France’s historical mission: victo-
rious France, daughter of the 1789 Revolution, naturally had to act as the 
defender of the oppressed.25 
But even the most convinced defenders of small nations tended to regard 
as worthy of consideration only those “historical nationalities” they saw as 
being sufficiently developed, well established, and presumably Francophile. 
This essentially included Poland, Bohemia, Romania, and what would after 
1918 become the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.26 The favoured 
status of these “historical nationalities” eventually crystallized into a policy 
of support for a narrowly defined group of countries in Eastern Europe. 
Generally, most French, whether agitators for “oppressed nationalities” or 
conservative diplomats, saw becoming a nation with rights to sovereignty 
that were worth defending as a progressive construct, the result of histori-
cal maturation towards viable statehood – not the right to immediate real-
ization of an affirmed national “nature”. From this point of view, Finland 
and the Baltic states, peripheral, comparatively “young”, and suspected of 
pro-German leanings, only barely made the cut. 
In this respect, however, Finland had managed to anchor itself on the 
French map of Europe as a real nationality, oppressed by Russia but none-
theless developed and active. The Baltic states, on the other hand, were up 
to 1918 considered (in the words of Julien Gueslin) a “grey area”.27 History 
and culture seemed to weigh on the side of Finland as an autonomous 
part of the Russian empire, whereas the Baltic states were seen in a more 
23  Cf. John Thompson, “Wilsonianism: dynamics of a conflicted concept”, International 
Affairs, 86:1 (2010), 27–47.
24  For the term and the phenomenon, cf. Jackson, “Politics, culture, and the security 
of France”, 578.
25  In the last volume of his monumental Histoire de France, written in 1922, Ernest 
Lavisse presented a messianic image of France as the protector of nationalities. 
26  Cf. István Bibó, La misère des petits États d’Europe de l’Est (Paris: Albin Michel, 
1993), 140.
27  For a comparison between the two, see Clerc, La Finlande et l’Europe du Nord, 25–57 
and Gueslin, La France et les petits États baltes, 37–48. 
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ambiguous way: Lithuania certainly had historical credentials, but Latvia 
and Estonia were seen as natural parts of the Russian whole. 
In the context of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, France’s deci-
sion-making thus tended to oscillate between caution and support under 
quickly changing circumstances. Taken in the feverish atmosphere fol-
lowing Lenin’s coup, the decision to recognize Finland’s independence in 
January of 1918 seemed to rekindle the idea among the French leadership 
of some nationalities as potential poles of stability, this time against chaos 
in Russia. Discussions were a mix of suspicion towards wayward national 
groups, reflections concerning Finland’s national worthiness, and hopes 
that these seemingly solid nationalities could be used to stabilize some 
parts of the Russian empire.28 After 1918–22 and up until the second half of 
the 1920s, a policy of containing the Bolshevik danger in Russia drew the 
French yet closer to the Baltic states: this is the moment when these states 
were allowed to come into view as important parts in the bulwark against 
bolshevism, small worthy members of the European community. Only in 
this geopolitical context will the idea of the Baltic states as “old nations” 
be allowed to overcome a representation of them as “ephemeral phenom-
ena” soon to be reintegrated into the Russian sphere.29 
In 1988–92, the international environment in which France took foreign 
policy decisions had deeply changed.30 Interwar multipolarity had been 
replaced by the Cold War’s superpower competition. Even though Charles 
de Gaulle had tried to challenge this bipolarity, France lacked both hard 
28  Cf. Louis Clerc, “Louis Raynaud et la reconnaissance de l’indépendance finlandaise 
par la France, 1917–1918”, “Muille maille vierahille…” Kalervo Hovi ja yleinen historia, 
ed. by Esa Sundbäck (Turku: Turun Historiallinen Yhdistys, 2002), 221–241.
29  This is well demonstrated by Gueslin, La France et les petits États baltes, 554–616. 
30  For general elements of Franco-Baltic relations during the early 20th century, cf. 
Clerc, La Finlande et l’Europe du Nord; Gueslin, La France et les petits États baltes; 
Xavier Fraudet, Politique étrangère française en mer Baltique (1871–1914), De l’exclusion 
à l’affirmation, Acta Universalis Stockholmiensis 77 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wik-
sell International, 2005); Suzanne Champonnois, “The Baltic states as an aspect of 
Franco-Soviet relations 1919–1934: a policy or several policies?” Contact or isolation? 
Soviet-Western relations in the interwar period, ed. by Alexander Loit, Studia Baltica 
Stockholmiensia 8, Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wick-
sell, 1991), 405–413. For general elements of France’s reactions to the crumbling of the 
Soviet Union and the Baltic States’ 1991 return to independence, cf. Frédéric Bozo, 
Mitterrand, la fin de la Guerre Froide et l’unification allemande: de Yalta à Maastricht 
(Paris: Odile Jacob, 2005). Suzanne Champonnois has written one of the few articles on 
French policy toward the Baltic question during the Cold War: Suzanne Champonnois, 
“French policy towards the Baltic states, 1939–1991, from abandonment to reunion”, The 
Baltic question during the Cold War, ed. by John Hiden, Vahur Made, David J. Smith 
(London: Routledge, 2008), 84–99. 
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and soft power to succeed in truly shaking off the effect of the East-West 
divide, and had to contend with its new status as a “middle power”.31 That 
new status meant that France did not have the capacity to act in this new 
period of changes as it had acted after the First World War. The structures 
created by European integration also had a significant effect: France’s rela-
tions with Germany gradually made the two countries key allies and part-
ners, even though France took a cautious stand towards German reunifica-
tion and agreed to it only in the context of a restructured and strengthened 
European Union.32 A more structured apparatus of conflict resolution, the 
development of multilateral diplomatic instruments and international 
organizations also framed France’s reactions to new developments. 
Finally, new norms and values had emerged, shaped by the rise of inter-
national laws and standards, decolonization in the 1950’s and 1960’s, and 
the emergence of a vigorous discourse on human rights in the 1970’s and 
1980’s.33 All these developments played in favour of the Baltic states, the 
status of which had evolved since the post-1918 period: the three Baltic 
states now existed de jure, their annexation had remained unrecognized 
by France, and their dissidents were denouncing human rights violations. 
More specifically, whereas the 1918–22 Baltic states had been a blip on the 
radar of French preoccupations, in 1988–92 these nations played a key role 
in bringing down the Soviet Union.34 They had become one of the most 
important flashpoints of Europe, drawing intense media attention and the 
scrutiny of organizations and states. In that context, the Baltic states con-
stituted a test of the French government’s and the West’s intentions regard-
ing the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 
31  Academic debates on “middle-sized” powers developed in France in the 1980s, and had 
clear aspects of introspection into the current role and status of a diminished France. 
Cf. for example the contributions concerning France in La moyenne puissance au XXe 
siècle, ed. by Jean-Claude Allain (Paris: FEDN - IHCC, 1989). 
32  More information on French policy towards German reunification see: Frédéric Bozo, 
“Mitterrand’s France, the end of the Cold War, and German unification: a reappraisal”, 
Cold War History, 7:4 (2007), 455–478. 
33  On the rise of the human rights discourse, see: Samuel Moyn, The last utopia: human 
rights in history (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2012). 
34  John Hiden, book review of Charlotte Alston, “Antonius Piip, Zigfrīds Meierovics 
and Augustinas Voldemaras: the Baltic States”, Journal of Baltic Studies, 42:3 (2011).
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Fitting the Baltic states and Finland into France’s foreign policy 
visions
In these two different chronological contexts, France’s relations with small 
countries in the Eastern Baltic were also a function of the general evolu-
tion of its foreign policy. 
France’s foreign policy in the years 1918–20 was first and foremost char-
acterized by the war’s aftermath and by efforts to adapt to an increasingly 
unfamiliar Europe. The German danger dominated, while 1918–19 saw 
several half-hearted attempts at intervention against the Bolsheviks. In 
both these phases, France’s policy was mostly reactive, relying on actors 
on the ground and strong personalities capable of leading French policy. 
The Baltic region was also overshadowed by Poland, which had become 
stabilized as an ally of France.35
These policy orientations were ambiguous regarding Finland and the 
Baltic states, as contradictory tensions pulled France’s diplomacy in differ-
ent directions. Once again, the evolution of Bainville’s rhetoric provides us 
with a good barometer of these uncertainties: while in 1917, the writer con-
demned the perspective of independence for the Baltic states and Finland, 
seeing them as threats to the Russian empire and thralls of Germany, the 
rise of Bolshevism in Russia after November of 1918 impelled him to look 
at these little nations with different eyes.36 Unpalatable and unstable as 
they were, these small national forces were at least present on the ground 
and potentially ready to fight the Reds.37 
Finland provides a good example of this evolution. Regarded by Paris 
with hostility for most of the war because of their links with Germany, the 
Finns declared their independence in December of 1917. French diplomacy 
ended up recognizing the new country on 4 January 1918 essentially for 
two reasons: the intense lobbying of the French consul in Helsinki, Louis 
Raynaud, and the French leadership’s hopes that this comparatively well-
known, stable national group would hold the line against Lenin.38 The fol-
lowing year and a half saw France alternate between support and criticism 
of Finland, according to the general context of Russian affairs and to Finn-
ish attitudes. In the spring of 1919, relations with Finland were considered 
35  Cf. David Stevenson, “France at the Paris Peace Conference: addressing the dilemmas 
of security”, French foreign and defence policy, 1918–1940: the decline and fall of a great 
power, ed. by Robert Boyce (London: Routledge, 1998), 10–27.
36  Jacques Bainville, La Russie et la barrière de l’Est (Paris: Plon, 1937), 39, 72–75. 
37  Ibid., 249–251.
38  Clerc, “Louis Raynaud et la reconnaissance de l’indépendance”. 
379Bergmane, Clerc: France’s relations with the Eastern Baltic
important enough for it to be counted among the countries to which France 
would send one of its half-dozen military missions dispatched to coun-
tries on the borders of Russia. France entertained high hopes that Finland 
would stabilize and remain in France’s orbit. But tensions rose again in the 
autumn as the White Russians advanced against the Bolsheviks and France 
tried to persuade the Finns to assist the White General Nikolai Yudenitch. 
Writing to his ambassadors on 24 October 1919, Foreign Minister Stephen 
Pichon summarized France’s position regarding Finland: “The position 
of the French government is that by subordinating her intervention in 
Petrograd to the satisfaction of demands that cannot be currently exam-
ined, Finland will let the psychological moment pass.”39 A few days before 
Pichon’s letter, Yudenitch’s White Army had been reported by the press 
agency Havas as having entered the suburbs of Petrograd: as the return of 
tsarist Russia finally seemed to be at hand, the French were quick to bury 
Finland. The hope for a return to geopolitical stability trumped concep-
tions about the right of self-determination for small nations. 
But in January of 1920, with Yudenitch’s army disbanding and its leader 
in an Estonian jail, the French diplomat Jules Laroche took stock of the sit-
uation and proposed the wholesale recognition of all de facto states created 
on the Western borders of the former Russian empire.40 Generally, different 
groups viewed the Baltic states either as small states that could be supported 
until they were asked to join a strong Russia, or the northernmost tip of a 
barrier erected between Europe’s two hell-raisers, Germany and Bolshevik 
Russia, with Poland as the crux.41 The dilemma between French hopes for 
a Russian renaissance and support for the Baltic states and Finland was 
solved only by the stabilization of the Bolsheviks in Russia. 
Once geopolitics had given way, the French were quick to make a virtue 
of necessity and to stabilize their vision of the Baltic states. Julien Gues-
lin has shown how the pesky small states of 1917–18 came to be considered 
with sympathy as model pupils of the League of Nations: poles of insta-
bility were now seen as hopes for stability in a European context deprived 
of its imperial anchors. The same was true for Finland. However, tensions 
returned with the 1930s: in a revealing report from January of 1938, the 
39  Stephen Pichon to diplomatic posts, Paris, 25.10.1919, series Europe 1918–1940/URSS, 
vol. 283, Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
40  Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1920, vol. I, doc. 32, 50: Les États limitrophes de 
la Russie et les bolcheviks, Jules Laroche, 20.1.1920. 
41  Suzanne Champonnois, “La mission militaire francaise en Estonie 1919–1920”, France-
Estonie: regards mutuels, ed. by Antoine Chalvin (Paris: Association France-Estonie, 
1997), 40–49. 
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French ambassador in Moscow Robert Coulondre outlined a pessimis-
tic account of the Baltic states and Finland, essentially describing their 
gradual descent into the German orbit.42 French policy had already then 
switched from intervention to mediation, and in 1939, France put a premium 
on relations with the Soviet Union rather than with the Baltic states and 
Finland: according to the French ambassador in London, Charles Corbin, 
Moscow’s 1939 strong-arm tactics and treaties with the Baltic states were 
“seen with resignation” both in London and Paris.43 Having successfully 
defended itself in the winter of 1939–40, and already considered as being 
more stabilized, Finland was cast in a different light.
The same fluctuations were discernible in French policy in 1988–92, well 
summarized in 1990 by Mitterrand: “We are in a terrible contradiction. 
Our interests are both in keeping Gorbachev where he is, and in supporting 
Lithuanian independence.”44 In 1989, in the context of a rapidly changing 
situation in Eastern Europe, one of the core principles of Mitterrand’s East-
ern Policy was support for a gradual transformation in a Soviet context.45 
While the French leadership celebrated the negotiated power transition in 
Poland in August of 1989, it was very cautious about what was perceived 
as the German rush toward reunification. As noted by Frédéric Bozo, dur-
ing the German refugee crisis in September of 1989, German reunification 
was perceived as a legitimate but untimely objective – the time was not 
ripe for it.46 Similarly, Baltic aspirations were seen as legitimate but France 
was unwilling to accelerate events in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. As in 
the Polish case, Mitterrand and French diplomats in Moscow were unsure 
how far changes could be encouraged without causing a backlash. On 29 
August a report prepared by the European Affairs Department for a meet-
ing of the French government advised: “our attitude must remain one of 
great caution, avoiding any declaration or inadvertent gesture that might 
be misinterpreted by Moscow or the nationalist movements.”47 
42  Coulondre to Yvon Delbos, Moscow, 12.1.1938, Archives of the Moscow embassy, 
Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
43  Charles Corbin to Paris, 771, 28.10.1939, Archives of the London embassy, Archives 
of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
44  Memorandum of Conversation, subject: meeting with President Mitterrand of France, 
19.4.1990, Key Largo, Florida, George Bush Presidential Library, The White House. 
45  Bozo, Mitterrand, la fin de la Guerre Froide et l’unification allemande, 83.
46  Ibid., 90.
47  “Notre attitude doit rester empreinte d’une grande prudence en évitant toute déclara-
tion ou tout geste intempestif susceptible d’être interpreté à Moscou où par les mouve-
ments nationalistes comme un signal erroné”: Conseil des Ministres du 30 août, éléments 
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Mitterrand was a strong supporter of Mikhail Gorbachev and his 
reformist tendencies in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, France was hardly 
in any position to take any action on its own without Germany: for the 
most part, Mitterrand’s caution was more a result of the West’s caution 
and of West Germany’s uneasiness regarding Baltic claims. The point was 
to ensure that Gorbachev would stay at the head of the USSR to handle the 
“grand bargain” concerning German Reunification.48 France did not cold-
shoulder the Baltic states any more or less than Chancellor Helmut Kohl, 
who did everything possible to avoid German implication in Baltic ques-
tions and to restrain both Baltic aspirations and the endeavours of other 
European countries to visibly support these aspirations.49 In the context 
of sensitive negotiations (European integration, the reunification of Ger-
many), France needed to retain good relations with Germany and thus to 
adapt its positions concerning the Baltic states to those of its neighbour. 
This propelled Paris towards a position of cautious support for Gorbachev 
compatible with German policy.50 This was not only France’s problem, and 
the Spanish authorities had clearly stated everybody’s dilemma in Decem-
ber of 1989: “The Western world is faced with an obvious contradiction: 
either lose this opportunity to support the Baltic states, with the conse-
quent breakdown of the principles held to this today (non-recognition of 
the annexation), or rather openly support Baltic claims for independence, 
reducing Gorbachev’s manoeuvrability and creating new difficulties for 
perestroika.”51 The geopolitical shackles were on, and whatever the amount 
of sympathy there was in France for Baltic pleas, this could not influence 
policy beyond a certain point. Supporting Mikhail Gorbachev seemed more 
important than principled support for the Baltic states. 
In this context, independence for the Baltic states appeared foreboding 
to François Mitterrand, who feared a possible outburst of civil war born of 
d’intervention, a/s: situation dans les républiques baltes, le 29 août 1989, series URSS 
(1986- 1990), file 6591, Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
48  Bozo, Mitterrand, la fin de la Guerre Froide et l’unification allemande, 211.
49  Kristina Spohr Readman, “Between political rhetoric and realpolitik calculations: 
Western diplomacy and the Baltic independence struggle in the Cold War endgame”, 
Cold War History, 6:1 (2006), 1–42; Mary Elise Sarotte, 1989: the struggle to create post-
Cold War Europe (Princeton University Press, 2011), 158.
50  George Bush, Brent Scowcroft, A world transformed (Knopf Doubleday Publishing 
Group, 1999), 215; “Deutsch-französische Konsultationen, Paris, 26 April 1990”, Deutsche 
Einheit Sonderedition aus den Akten des Bundeskanzleramtes 1998/90 (R. Oldenbourg 
Verlag, 1998), 1056.
51  COREAU (Correspondance européenne) from Madrid, 16.1.1990, Series URSS (1986–
1990), file 6592, Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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uncontrolled separatism, and was in principle unconvinced by the resur-
gence of old-fashioned nationalism in Europe.52 Mitterrand’s central prior-
ity in 1990 had been European integration and stability, and he expressed 
his concerns to the acting President of Latvia Anatoliy Gorbunovs in May 
of 1991: “Are we going to witness a general breaking-up of Europe? How-
ever good the cause, we wonder what will emerge from this disorder. A 
destabilization of the whole continent.”53 In contacts with Gorbachev, 
Mitterrand also emphazised the importance of the integrity of Soviet 
territory: in November of 1991 during a private conversation with Gor-
bachev, Mitterrand explained that: “If there is a collapse, we will go back 
to what you had before Peter the Great. It would be a historical catastro-
phe and would contradict France’s interests.” By evoking Peter the Great, 
the French president was referring to what he saw as a period of dangerous 
instability in Eastern Europe, caused by the lack of an organizing power 
that could counter-balance Germany. “Centuries of history teach us that 
France needs an ally to maintain a balance in Europe,” he explained, and 
went on: “[…] any collapse of integrity in the East would bring instability. 
[…] Furthermore, we are great friends of today’s Germany. But it would be 
very dangerous if there would be a soft underbelly in the North or East of 
Germany. Because the Germans will always have a tendency and a temp-
tation to penetrate these areas.”54 But yet again, France’s policy changed 
in 1992 once the survival of the Soviet Union itself became definitely com-
promised: the most important priority then became to stabilize what was 
left, including the Baltic states. 
52  Hubert Védrine, Les mondes de François Mitterrand: à l’Élysée, 1981–1995 (Paris: 
Fayard, 1996), 483. Mitterrand’s last official speech, given in front of the European 
Parliament in January of 1995, abundantly expressed his vision of “nationalism” as an 
unhealthy, disrupting phenomenon. The speech provided one of Mitterrand’s best-known 
sound bites: “Nationalism means war” (“Le nationalisme, c’est la guerre”). Besides the 
theatrics of a speech obviously staged for posterity by a president at the end of both his 
mandate and his life (he left the presidency in March of 1995 and died in January of 
1996), nationalism meant different things to the leaders of Europeanized and war-worn 
France and to the Baltic leaderships of 1988–92. Text of the speech: <http://centenaire.
parti-socialiste.fr/article.php3%3Fid_article=376.html> (accessed 14 September 2016). 
53  “Est-ce que l’on va assister à un éclatement général de l’Europe? Même si c’est pour 
une juste cause, on s’interroge sur ce qui naîtra de ce désordre. Une déstabilisation sur 
l’ensemble du continent.” (Entretien du Président de la République avec M. Gorbunovs, 
Président de la République de Lettonie, le 16 mai 1991 à 18h, Archives de la Présidence 
de la République, 5 AG 4/ CD 314, file 13, French National Archives). 
54  Anatoly Chernyaev, Diary 1991, 150, available online: <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB345/The%20Diary%20of%20Anatoly%20Chernyaev,%201991.pdf> 
(accessed 14 September 2016).
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In both these cases, French caution towards independence for the 
countries of the Eastern Baltic seems to be built not so much on imperial 
nostalgia as on the fear of destabilization for a state depending on stabil-
ity in Europe (at the end of the Cold War), or on plans to redraw Europe’s 
boundaries after a war that significantly weakened it (1918). In these cir-
cumstances, the Baltic states and Finland could at times become impor-
tant elements of France’s broader foreign policy orientations. While in 
the long term, France seeks stability through twentieth century versions 
of the concert of nations, in times of crisis, a more positive policy towards 
nationalities can be accepted. That was the case in 1918 when Finland and 
the Baltic states emerged and were left for a time to stabilize as “historical 
nations”. This was also the case in 1991 when the Soviet Union had passed 
the tipping point. 
Domestic policy and bilateral networks as providers of alternative 
visions
By emphazising France’s foreign policy as an activity isolated from the 
rest of French policy, one might certainly reach the same conclusion for 
the Eastern Baltic seen from Paris as François Bédarida, who wrote that 
before 1939, the Eastern Baltic was “beyond the sphere of French strategic 
interest”.55 The Baltic states and Finland were also generally less well-known 
in France than other Eastern European countries: upon arrival in Paris in 
1919, the head of the Estonian delegation to the Paris conference, Kaarel 
Robert Pusta, summarized this feeling by writing that they were “unknown 
men, from an unknown country”.56 His colleague Jaan Poska wrote in his 
diary about the “indifference towards us […] manifested by our allies”.57 
The same words can be found in eyewitness accounts from the late 1980s 
when another generation of Baltic diplomats was sent to Western capitals 
to re-claim the independence of the three republics. On 2 September 1991, 
when this new diplomatic battle for Baltic independence was almost over, 
55  François Bédarida, “France, Britain and the Nordic countries”, Scandinavian Journal 
of History, 2 (1977), 7–27. 
56  Julien Gueslin, “Paris sur Baltique 1918–1949”, Regards sur l’Est, 34 (2003).
57  Quote in: Vahur Made, “The Baltic states and Europe 1918–1940”, The Baltic ques-
tion during the Cold War, ed. by John Hiden, Vahur Made, David J. Smith (London: 
Routledge, 2008), 7. 
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the President of the Supreme Council of Lithuania, Vytautas Landsbergis, 
told the press: “Westerners have not lifted a finger for us.”58
But aspects related to France’s domestic context and the role of per-
sonalities and networks have to be brought into the discussion to explain 
the jittery nature of French policy towards the Baltic states and Finland. 
Indeed, at critical junctures in time, various groups and personalities 
acquired the capacity to act in France (quoting Julien Gueslin’s formula) 
as “itinerant salesmen” of the positions of the Baltic states and Finland 
in Europe, influencing decisions, spreading information and facilitating 
contacts.59 These elements developed differently in the post-World War I 
context and in the late 1980s. 
Networks between France, Finland and the Baltic States existed before 
the Baltic countries achieved independence in 1917–19. These Finnish and 
Baltic networks were active in France before 1918, when a number of these 
personalities branched into the diplomatic service of their respective coun-
tries. These networks, less efficient in the case of the Baltic states, had in 
the case of Finland managed to establish the image of a developed nation, 
a functioning province, a polity in the making oppressed by Russia: “cul-
tural transfers”60 of knowledge and conceptions of these national move-
ments turned into pure lobbying before and after the war, as described by 
Chiara Tessaris in her work on Latvia’s presence in the League of Nations.61 
These lobbying networks followed the patterns of “interest groups” 
studied, for example, by Jan Beyers, Rainer Eising and William Maloney: 
informal organisations revolving around certain political interests.62 The 
hard core was composed of professional militants of bilateral cultural and 
political relations, Balts and Finns installed in France, but also Frenchmen, 
58  “Les Occidentaux n’ont pas levé le plus petit doigt pour nous. Entretien avec V. Lands-
bergis”, Le Monde, 2 September 1991.
59  Other examples of the same phenomenon concerning Hungary in Catherine Horel, 
De l’exotisme à la modernité: un siècle de voyage français en Hongrie, 1818–1910 (Budapest: 
ELTE, 2003); Nicolas Bauquet, “Les réseaux franco-hongrois et la France, de 1896 à 1914: 
auxiliaires d’une découverte ou marchands d’illusion?” Studia Politica (sept. 2005), 
1–36; Stéphane Reznikov, Francophilie et identité tchèque, 1848–1914 (Paris: Honoré 
Champion, 2002).
60  A concept developed by Michel Espagne, Le prisme du Nord. Pays du Nord-France-
Allemagne (1750–1920) (Tusson: Du Lérot, 2005).
61  Cf. Chiara Tessaris, Peace and security beyond military power: the League of Nations 
and the Polish-Lithuanian dispute (1920–1923), PhD dissertation (University of Colum-
bia, 2015). 
62  Jan Beyers, Rainer Eising, William Maloney, “Researching interest group politics in 
Europe and elsewhere: much we study, little we know?”, West European Politics, 31:6 
(2008), 1103–1128. 
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all of whom drew symbolic and sometimes material resources from their 
capacity to incarnate in Paris a certain culture and the political “cause” 
attached to it. French “specialists”, heavily influenced by the rhetoric of 
Finns and Balts, were seen as more neutral, and were sometimes consulted 
for advice by the press or by decision-makers on matters linked to these 
countries. Good examples are the jurist Albert de Lapradelle for Finland, 
or the journalist Henry de Montfort for the Baltic states – both were used 
as “experts” by the French government, in the case of Lapradelle up until 
the late 1920s. Motivations amongst them ranged from the wish to defend 
just causes to the social resources that came with the qualification of being 
an expert on a precise question. A certain attraction for novelty was mixed 
with the exaltation of seeing themselves as the midwives of new nations. 
Some of these people had a direct influence on foreign policy, not so much 
shaping it from scratch but nudging it in certain directions in times of 
uncertainty: this is obvious in the case of Professor Paul Boyer, who advo-
cated Finland as an expert with the French government, using his contacts 
to influence the circles of power in the winter 1917–18.63
It should be stressed, like Nicolas Bauquet does, that these networks 
were highly dependent on the atmosphere and politics of the country in 
which they deployed. Their activities were constrained by the local situa-
tion, even more so because the police often monitored them as foreign activ-
ists.64 Information coming from these networks also had to be adapted to a 
French context – before 1918, for example, no expression of active hostility 
towards the Russian leadership was likely to work beyond very small circles 
of French society. Likewise, French audiences were eager for all expressions 
of attachment to French culture and appreciation for French arts and the 
French language, interpreting these as positive signs of “national matu-
rity”, and as potential for the political support of France. 
Although they were complex and heavily constrained in their actions, 
these networks were maintained in the long term, and could influence 
French politics at key moments. When decisions had to be made concern-
ing regions the French leadership had little knowledge of, and where France 
had no ready representatives, this motley crew of friendship societies, cul-
tural associations, and “specialists” could suddenly become an important 
relay in official decision-making. These networks clearly played a role in a 
63  Clerc, La Finlande et l’Europe du Nord.
64  The French police, for instance, had a file on Kaarel Pusta: file Karel Pusta, 19940469/425, 
dos 37127; card Kaarel Pusta, 19940508/1756, Moscow fund, French National Archives. 
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phenomenon that Charlotte Alston has summarized as the efforts of small 
states to “help themselves”.65 
In the period of 1989–91, agitation in connection with the Baltic cause in 
France could not really benefit anymore from networks anchored in bilat-
eral relations. Links with the Baltic nations had never been particularly 
tight, and the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian communities in France 
were relatively small. As observed by Yves Plasseraud, after 1945 “the pub-
lic lost the memory of the Baltic states and one only spoke about the peo-
ples living in the periphery of the USSR as about national minorities that 
seemed to have always belonged to the Soviet Union”.66 Here again, geo-
political assessments influenced cultural perceptions: there was a strong 
tendency to interpret what was geopolitically impossible as being cultur-
ally unsavoury. 
In general, though, this realistic approach was not endorsed with any 
enthusiasm: in private, France’s diplomatic leadership welcomed Baltic 
aspirations to independence out of a new consciousness of the principles 
emphazised since the end of World War I and reaffirmed during the Cold 
War, such as human rights, self-determination and non-recognition of ille-
gal annexation. The activities of the Baltic independence movements also 
attracted the interest of French journalists in 1987, initiating a slow pro-
cess of reintroducing the Baltic question to French debates, of once again 
opening the window to alternative perceptions of the Baltic states. In the 
period of 1987–89, news from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania was mainly 
framed as the rumblings of nationalist movements on the Soviet periphery. 
The historical origins of the Baltic problem were evoked but were not dis-
cussed more than other aspects of the Baltic drive for independence such 
as the situation of Lithuanian Catholics, protests of the Russian speaking 
sector of the population in Estonia, russification in Riga, or Baltic eco-
nomic performance.
The turning point came in August of 1989, when the Baltic Way pro-
vided a visible news item and a basis for efficiently communicating the 
main Baltic arguments for independence. In the following days, French 
newspapers became relays of the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian mes-
sage to French society: an alternative history could emerge once geopolitics 
65  Charlotte Alston, Antonius Piip, Zigfrīds Meierovics and Augustinas Voldemaras: the 
Baltic states (London: Haus, 2010).
66  Yves Plasseraud, “La connaissance de l’Estonie en France”, France-Estonie: regards 
mutuels, ed. by Antoine Chalvin (Paris: Association France-Estonie, 1997), 115.
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seemed once again to give way. Le Monde67 and Libération,68 both important 
national daily papers, reminded readers of the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact, 
Baltic claims disputing the legality of their annexation by the USSR, and 
the non-recognition of this annexation. In Le Figaro, Pierre Bocev high-
lighted the dilemma the Kremlin was facing,69 while Olivier Weber (Le 
Point) concluded like most French media that “the Baltic desire for inde-
pendence had a legal basis”70, while La Croix stated that “Soviet occupation 
in the Baltic states was coming to an end”. The mouthpiece of the French 
Communist party, l’Humanité, was isolated in explaining that there was 
no link between the annexation of the Baltic countries and the Molotov–
Ribben trop Pact.71 L’Humanité’s harsh stand towards Baltic claims brought 
the paper into sharp contrast with most of the French press, in which rhe-
torical elements concerning the Baltic states developed during the Cold War 
(national culture, non-recognition of the 1940 annexation, etc.) resurfaced. 
By the end of 1989, as the situation in the Baltic states became increas-
ingly tense, journalists and the conservative parliamentary opposition to 
Mitterrand’s ruling Socialist Party were the first to reach out to Baltic per-
sonalities and to question French policy regarding what was by now called 
“the Baltic question”. This pressure pushed Mitterrand and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs to at least rhetorically emphazise France’s non-recognition 
of Baltic annexation and, for example, the fact that Lithuanian and Lat-
vian gold was still in the vaults of the Banque de France.72 Meant to mask 
French caution, this rhetoric, however, constrained French foreign policy 
67  “Les Pays Baltes contestent la légalité de leur rattachement à l’URSS”, Le Monde, 24 
August 1989.
68  “600 0000 Baltes marchent contre l’annexion”, Libération, 24 August 1989.
69  Pierre Bocev, “Le Kremlin face à l’histoire”, Le Figaro, 28 August 1989.
70  Olivier Weber, “Le défi des Pays Baltes”, Le Point, 3 October 1989.
71  Bernard Frederic, “Les tensions nationalistes”, 25 August 1989, l’Humanité. L’Humanité 
and the French Communist Party in general would later also be at odds with the rest 
of the French press concerning Ukraine, criticizing European and Ukrainian policy 
towards Russia. On that, cf. Valentyna Dymytrova, “La “révolution orange” dans le 
prisme des éditoriaux de la presse française”, Sens et représentation en conflit: controverses 
et différends textuels, ed. by Karsten Forbrig and Cloé Tessier (Peter Lang, 2011), 117–127. 
72  Cf. various documents in French Presidential Archives 5AG 4/CD 242, dossier 4, 
French National Archives: Communiqué de Roland Dumas le 12 mars 1990, François 
Mitterrand “7sur7”, 23 March 1990; Conférence de presse conjointe de François Mitter-
rand et de Vaclav Havel, 20.3.1990; Conférence de presse conjointe de monsieur François 
Mitterrand président de la République française et de monsieur Georges Bush, président 
des États Unis, Key Largo, 19.4.1990; Conférence de presse conjointe de Monsieur Fran-
çois Mitterrand Président de la République et de Monsieur Helmut Khôl chancelier de 
la République Fédérale d’Allemagne à l’issue des 55ème consultations franco-allemandes, 
Palais de l’Elysée, 26.4.1990; Présidence de la République, Service de Presse, Conférence de 
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in a domestic political frame and prepared the about-face of 1991: it dis-
seminated the idea of illegal Soviet rule and brought new visions of the 
Baltic case to a wider audience. The Baltic problem and its main contours, 
which for 50 years had been minor issues, of concern only to interested dip-
lomats and civil servants, suddenly became part of public debates framed 
not only in geopolitical terms but also in sentimental and idealistic terms.73 
Mitterrand’s caution in the Baltic case came under attack in Parliament 
(the French National Assembly and Senate) as part of criticism directed at 
his support for Gorbachev. The Right-wing parties Union pour la Démocra-
tie Française (UDF) and Rassemblement pour la République (RPR) asked 
for stronger support of Baltic independence and often reminded the assem-
blies of the Soviet Union’s illegal annexation in 1940 and the French non-
recognition policy.74 The Baltic cause also gained some measure of bipar-
tisan support, as a parliamentary group of deputies from the opposition 
and the majority was established in both the French Senate and National 
Assembly to support Baltic independence.75 
In 1990–91, members of these groups helped organize visits of Baltic 
officials to Paris and advocated Baltic interests in France.76 For example, 
the legislator Michel Pelchat, president of the Baltic support group in the 
National Assembly, was mandated by the three Baltic governments to solve 
the matter of the Baltic embassies in Paris, which had been given to Soviet 
authorities by the French after 1945.77 The legislator’s motivations are dif-
Presse conjointe de Monsieur François Mitterrand Président de la République et de Michail 
Gorbatchev Président de l’Union des républiques socialistes soviétiques, Moscou, 25.5.1990.
73  “In the Baltic context, most Western governments appeared locked into a Cold War 
rhetoric and thus into Cold War policy, when their new Realpolitik priorities clearly 
lay elsewhere”: Readman, Between political rhetoric, 29. This idea is certainly true in 
the American case but the Baltic question was never a major part of the French Cold 
War discourse. 
74  Cf. Assemblée Nationale, Constitution du 4 octobre 1958, 9e Législature, Seconde ses-
sion ordinaire de 1989–1990, (4e séance), 1e séance du mercredi 4 avril 1990, Politique de 
la France à l’égard des Pays de l’Est, 72. 
75  Communiqué Association Parlementaire France-Pays baltes, Paris, 28.06.1990, Tausta-
materjal Prantsusmaa, 1990–1991, Box 4.1.3., Estonian Diplomatic Archives; Groupe 
d’études sur l’Estonie, La Lettonie et Lithuanie, Taustamaterjal Prantsusmaa, 1990–1991, 
Box 4.1.3., Estonian Diplomatic Archives; Michel Pelchat, Député de l’Essone à V. Lands-
bergis, Président du Conseil Suprême de Lituanie, Paris, 25.7.1990, Box 1990_39_216, 
Latvian Diplomatic Archives. 
76  Michel Pelchat, Député de l’Essone à François Mitterrand, Président de la République, 
n.d., Box 1990_39_216, Latvian Diplomatic Archives.
77  Michel Pelchat to Lennart Meri, 10 April 1991; Mandate to Michel Pelchat signed by 
Lennart Meri, 22 April 1991, 4.1.3-7: Taustamaterjal Prantsusmaa 1990–1991f, Estonian 
Diplomatic Archives. 
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ficult to entangle, but they echo a logic observed in 1900–20: a discreet 
backbencher, Pelchat gathered information from Baltic representatives, 
he was interested in international questions, he gained domestic political 
capital from becoming an expert on the question, secured prominence for 
working on behalf of a just cause, and finally used the issue as a stick with 
which to beat the government. All these elements and the governmental 
response of caution and reason were on display in a heated exchange that 
took place between Pelchat and the Foreign Minister Roland Dumas in the 
National Assembly in December of 1990.78 
At the same time, different branches of the French Foreign Service 
seemed more inclined to consider Baltic arguments than the President and 
his diplomatic advisers. French diplomats in Moscow were circumspect 
regarding the Baltic drive towards independence, but clearly considered 
the Soviet historical claim to these territories as void.79 By the end of 1989, 
the chief of the Soviet Affairs Subdivision of the French Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs stated that the conditions of their annexation by the Soviet Union 
in 1940 gave strong moral legitimacy to the claims of the Baltic nations.80 
Analyses conducted by the Ministry’s think-tank (Centre d’analyse et de 
prévision) explained that the Yalta system could not be considered nullified 
as long as the Baltic states had not recovered their independence,81 while 
the Ministry’s Legal Department stated clearly that “[…] in our opinion 
the Baltic states still exist. […] Our recognition of these states after World 
War I is still valid. In our view, the legal existence of these states has sur-
vived their annexation, even though they have not been able to exercise 
their sovereignty”.82 All in all, as Aina Nagobads-Ābols has written, despite 
78  Journal officiel de la République francaise, Débats parlementaires, Assemblée Natio-
nale, consitution du 4 octobre 1958, 9e législature, Première session ordinaire de 1990–
1991, 126 • séance, 2 • séance du mercredi 19 décembre 1990, 7138.
79  Ambassadeur de France en URSS à Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Mission en 
Lituanie, 10.–12.3.1991, series Europe (1991–1995), file URSS 7667, Archives of the French 
Foreign Ministry; Ambassade de France en URSS, note Lituanie et question balte, 
Moscou 10.5.1990, Series Europe (1991–1995), file URSS 6686, Archives of the French 
Foreign Ministry. 
80  Direction d’Europe, sous-directeur d’URSS, Paris, le 22.9.1989, French Presidential 
Archives, series 5AG4 / CD 242 file 4, French National Archives. 
81  Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Centre d’analyse et de prévision, note L’Etat de 
droit au droit de l’Etat ou la Lituanie martyre, 16.1.1991, series Europe (1991–1995), file 
URSS 7667, Archives of the French Foreign Ministry.
82  Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Direction des affaires juridiques, rédacteur Mr. 
D’Haussy, note pour la Direction des affaires politiques, La position française à l’égard 
des Républiques Baltes, 9.3.1990, series 5 AG 4/CD 242, file 4, French National Archives.
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the President’s caution,83 the Baltic cause found a number of efficient relays 
in the Ministry:84 diplomats who had worked on a daily basis with Soviet 
affairs considered the independence of the Baltic nations to be an inevita-
ble development, and even supported it or personally felt strongly for it.85
These positions in the Ministry reached the President, especially via an 
April 1990 report written by the Director of the European Affairs Depart-
ment Jacques Blot, where he criticized France’s official policy of caution in 
clear terms. In this conflict of irreconcilable claims, France had to have a 
plan of action in case the Soviet side opted to use force: “If the current esca-
lation continues”, Blot explained, “slowly but inevitably, we will be forced 
to imperceptibly accept the unacceptable: to witness the suppression of a 
desire for freedom in nations, the annexation of which by the Soviet Union 
we have never recognized.”86 Blot’s arguments, however, did not have any 
direct consequences: the President commented that the report expressed 
“an interesting point of view”87 but did not follow-up on Blot’s guidelines. 
He tried instead to reconcile the Soviet and Baltic points of view. During 
a press conference in Moscow, for instance, the President stated both that 
“France did not recognize the annexation” and that, nevertheless, “as of this 
day Lithuania is enclosed in the constitutional reality of the Soviet Union. 
These two views are hard to reconcile. I do not want to be the judge”.88 In a 
private meeting, he told Lithuania’s Prime Minister Kazimiere Prunskiene 
that “[…] Lithuania has a right to its own sovereignty. But the reality is that 
Lithuania has been welded to the USSR”.89 
83  The communist daily L’Humanité was particularly vocal in its criticism of the Baltic 
States, criticizing their raw nationalism, the role of Baltic Nazi collaborators during 
World War II, their treatment of Russian-speaking minorities, etc. Examples of articles 
on these themes can be found in L’Humanité’s web-based archives, for example <http://
www.humanite.fr/node/33020> (accessed 2 September 2015). 
84  Aina Nagobads-Ābols, Parīze, Madride, Lisabona un atpakaļ Rīgā (Riga: Zinātne, 
2000), 36.
85  Lettre de René Roudaut, sous-directeur de la sous-direction URSS à Lennart Meri, 
Ministre des Affaires étrangères de l’Estonie, n.d., series Taustamaterjal Prantsusmaa, 
1990–1991, file 4.1.3, Estonian Diplomatic Archives.
86  Direction d’Europe, le Directeur, note Pays baltes: le conflit des deux légitimités, 3.4.990, 
series AN, AG 4/CD 242, file 4, Archives of the French Foreign Ministry. 
87  Ibid.
88  Présidence de la République, Conférence de Presse conjointe de François Mitterrand 
et de Mikhaïl Gorbatchev, Moscou, 25 May 1990. 
89  Présidence de la République, compte-rendu, entretien du Président de la République 
avec Madame Prunskiene, Premier Ministre de Lituanie, 10.5.1990 18 h 45, series AN, 
5AG4/DM 48, file 11, Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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Thus, while caution and international pressures dominated French 
policy regarding Baltic claims to independence, it was also the result of 
interactions between different actors – the President, the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, and members of the National Assembly and Senate all had an 
influence as well, paving the way for changes in perceptions. In the French 
Fifth Republic system, however, the President held sway over foreign pol-
icy and things could not move forward without him. The policy resulting 
from these interactions can be described as one of small gestures towards 
the Balts followed immediately by disavowals stemming from the fear of 
destabilizing Gorbachev or of going against German attempts to down-
play the Baltic question. 
In April of 1990, France and Germany sent a letter to Lithuania’s Pres-
ident V. Landsbergis, asking him to suspend Lithuania’s declaration of 
independence in order to facilitate their negotiations with the USSR. How-
ever, Mitterrand refused to act as a mediator in these negotiations when it 
became clear that the Germans were unwilling to become more involved 
in the Lithuanian crisis, and the Soviets criticized even this comparatively 
cautious Franco-German move.90 In November of 1990, when France 
invited the Baltic states to participate in a CSCE meeting in Paris, the 
move prompted Gorbachev to lose his temper and demand that the French 
hosts of the conference ask Baltic ministers to leave the room.91 While in 
January of 1991, Roland Dumas and Hans-Dietrich Genscher sent a letter 
to Eduard Shevardnadze condemning the use of force against civilians in 
Vilnius and Riga,92 both Mitterrand and Kohl privately assured Gorbachev 
that they understood the complexity of the situation in the Baltic states and 
supported him.93 This policy of small steps and caution ended in August 
of 1991, when the French position changed radically due to the attempted 
putsch in the Soviet Union. As in 1918–20, the potential of contacts with 
90  Cf. published documents in Vytautas Landsbergis, Un peuple sort de prison (Baltijos 
kopija, 2007). 
91  Interview with Roland Dumas, Minister of Foreign Affairs 1988–93, Paris, March 
2010; interview with Ambassador Philippe de Suremain, Deputy Director of European 
Affairs Division 1989–91, Paris, March 2010; interview with Ambassador René Roudaut, 
Director of the USSR Subdivision 1990–92, Budapest, April 2010.
92  Déclaration commune des ministres des affaires étrangères de France et d’Allemagne, 
le 13.1.1991, series AN 5AG 4/CD 242, file 4, Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. 
93  Youri Doubinine, Moscou-Paris dans un tourbillon diplomatique: témoignage d’un 
ambassadeur (Paris: Imaginaria, 2002), 368; Christian Neef, “The Gorbachev files: did 
Gorbachev know about violent crackdowns?”, Spiegel Online, 8 (2011): <http://www.
spiegel.de/international/europe/the-gorbachev-files-secret-papers-reveal-truth-behind-
soviet-collapse-a-779277-2.html> (accessed 24 August 2015).
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the Baltic states was then allowed to flourish freely and develop into a more 
active and positive French policy towards these countries. 
Conclusion
This article has aimed to consider the different levels at which France’s 
reactions towards the Baltic States and Finland have been shaped. While 
perceptions of the geopolitical situation and long-term strategic consid-
erations framed these reactions and prompted France to consider wider 
implications linked to Russia/the Soviet Union beyond the specifics of Baltic 
and Finnish developments, other levels also contributed to shaping French 
policy. In times of crisis, these different levels could be allowed a certain 
influence on the re-shaping of French attitudes towards these small states.94
In the context of this special issue, representations and historical memo-
ries obviously come to mind as elements that were left to influence French 
reactions – once the geopolitical situation started to fluctuate, discontinui-
ties were allowed to appear. Finland is a good example of this in 1917–18, 
when memories of past relations resurfaced: at that time, the Baltic states 
were less strongly anchored on the French map of Europe than “histori-
cal nationalities”, whereas Finland was known as an oppressed nationality 
since 1900. In 1990 though, the Baltic states evoked memories of histori-
cal developments, their maturation during the interwar period and their 
well-known ordeal at the hands of the Soviet Union. In 1990, the ways 
“nationalities” were defined had also changed and one could say that the 
Baltic States were then seen as historically grounded, political nationali-
ties. Yet in both cases, key French actors seemed to consider geopolitical 
stability first, and alternative perceptions were allowed to appear only in 
the cracks of this geopolitical approach in the context of sudden changes 
and uncertainties.
France’s relations with small states in the Eastern Baltic thus appear 
more complex than the cliché of French hostility and cynicism. French 
94  Something that was true not only of France, as Esa Sundbäck highlighted the same 
elements in his description of Britain’s reactions to Baltic and Finnish developments 
after 1917. If Sundbäck deals mostly with geopolitics in his 1991 article (Esa Sundbäck, 
“Finland, Scandinavia and the Baltic states viewed within the framework of the border 
state policy of Great Britain from the autumn of 1918 to the spring of 1919”, Scandinavian 
Journal of History, 16:4 (1991), 313–334), he considers a much broader range of influences 
shaping British reactions in his PhD: Esa Sundbäck, Finland in British Baltic policy: 
British political and economic interests regarding Finland in the aftermath of the First 
World War, 1918–1923, Suomalainen tiedeakatemian toimituksia (Gummerus, 2001). 
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foreign policy developed first in a general international context, a structure 
of international relations that was interpreted in different ways by French 
decision-makers. Small states were also seen as parts of wider foreign 
policy orientations. Finally, a host of less clearly defined but nonetheless 
important elements linked to bilateral relations, lobbying and network-
ing influenced developments. Far from the ethereal perfection of theories, 
elements combined on the spot into a messy, context-dependent, day-to-
day process of shaping policy towards the Baltic states and Finland in the 
post-1918 world, and the Baltic States in the late 1980s. 
Some elements, both general and more specific, can be distinguished in 
the long term. First of all, France appears as a weakened country in both 
cases, with an internationally restricted margin for manoeuvring, and is 
interested mostly in stability and the status quo. Two world wars, four years 
of occupation and a difficult process of decolonisation reduced the country 
to the measure of a middle-sized power, wary of sudden changes in Europe 
and often looking to Russia for stability in Eastern Europe. In the long term, 
doubts and incomprehension have characterized France’s official responses 
to the claims of national groups, from the early twentieth century insist-
ence on imperial stability to Mitterrand’s defiance of “nationalism”. More 
specifically, France’s interests in the Eastern Baltic have always been at best 
a function of other considerations – German influence, Russian stability, 
etc. In this context, nationalities in the Eastern Baltic have seldom been 
considered as international actors per se, but have instead often been seen 
as a mix of considerations concerning human rights, relations with Rus-
sia, and relations with Germany. 
At the same time, in the short term and in certain circumstances, 
France’s policy has dedicated some attention to nationalities in the East-
ern Baltic, and changed its stance according to circumstances. Networks 
of people interested in Baltic questions have sometimes been left free to 
influence civil society debates but also official French policy. In 1918–20, 
these networks consisted mostly of Baltic representatives and their friends 
in Paris. In the early 1920s, fear of Bolshevism inspired the French to con-
sider the Baltic states more positively as outposts of the West against Lenin: 
the geopolitical stage was set for a cultural reassessment of these small 
nations as essential parts of the European cultural landscape. The return 
of the Soviet Union to the international arena in the late 1920s and the rise 
of tensions with Germany in the 1930s would once again place these rela-
tions with the Baltic states in question as the French leadership proceeded 
to lean increasingly on Moscow for support against Berlin. 
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In the late 1980s, pro-Baltic networks rallied French personalities inter-
ested in raising consciousness about the Baltic cause or in boosting their 
own profile through defending a widely publicized human rights cause. At 
the end of the Cold War, perceptions of small states in the Eastern Baltic 
had also changed: Finland was considered a Scandinavian country, while 
the Soviet Union’s Baltic republics were also seen through France’s non-
recognition of their annexation and incorporation into the Soviet territory 
as stabilized but oppressed political and cultural groups. Time had passed 
since 1918, and memories of relations had accumulated. 
A parallel with the Ukrainian case obviously comes to mind – would it 
be possible to look at the same patterns and levels in order to obtain a multi-
faceted image of France’s reactions to the Ukrainian crisis? Ukraine has had 
an ambiguous position in France’s policy, from a short period of support for 
Ukrainian independence in 1917–1895 to the indifference of the Cold War, but 
one can observe the same elements in play in a rather ambiguous, rapidly 
changing pattern. Franco-Ukrainian relations in the 1980s–90s were domi-
nated by France’s relations with Russia and its reluctant stance towards the 
possibility of Ukrainian independence.96 France has also had little economic 
contact with Ukraine.97 However, the June 1992 bilateral treaty signed with 
France was Ukraine’s first treaty with a Western European country. In the 
early 2000’s, the Orange Revolution made Ukraine a darling of the French 
press, a cause worth defending against Vladimir Putin’s Russia.98 In a wider 
context where post-2004 France forged closer ties to Washington, geopolitics 
allowed a window for more positive perceptions of Ukraine to surface, and 
sympathy abounded (Le Monde’s editorial on 25 November 2004, was enti-
tled Sauver l’Ukraine)99 even if moderation remained the official approach 
in 2014: in a February 2015 radio interview, just before the second Minsk 
meeting, France’s Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius emphazised that while 
95  Cf. Volodymyr Kosyk, La politique de la France à l’égard de l’Ukraine, mars 1917-février 
1918 (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1981), 181–214; Castelbajac, Gasquet, Soutou, 
Recherches sur la France, 127–139. 
96  John Edwin Mroz and Oleksander Pavliuk, “Ukraine, Europe’s linchpin”, Foreign 
Affairs, 75:3 (May-June 1996), 58.
97  Olga Alexandrova, “Ukraine and Western Europe”, Harvard Ukrainian Studies, 20 
(1996), 145–170. 
98  Valentyna Dymytrova, “La “révolution orange” dans le prisme des éditoriaux de la 
presse française”, Sens et représentation en conflit: controverses et différends textuels, ed. 
by Karsten Forbrig, Cloé Tessier (Brusells: Peter Lang, 2011), 117–127.
99  In Le Figaro, Joseph Macé-Scaron reminded readers that “Ukrainian identity is not 
a fantasy” (“Le goût du tatami”, Le Figaro, 4.12.2004), something only very few French 
commentators would have taken for granted only 20 years before.
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there was general agreement on not recognizing Crimea’s annexation de jure, 
contesting it by force was out of the question.100 With all due consideration 
to context, echoes of the Baltic case might be too loud to ignore, and future 
scholars should be able to look beneath the surface at networks and lobby-
ing efforts: going further back in time, examples of pro-Ukrainian activism 
in France start with the 1917–18 network of Jean Pélissier, a journalist and 
writer who contributed to achieving the semi-recognition of Ukraine by 
France in the winter 1917–18.101
Under a surface of geopolitical logic, various elements are involved: the 
general framework of international relations, France’s domestic policy, the 
pressures of public opinion and values, the influence of groups and per-
sonalities, the cumulative memory of past relations, etc. If most of the time 
the iron logic of geopolitics and the demands of European stability shape 
France’s policy towards these small states, other elements can come into 
play in times of crisis. While it has generally been interested in maintaining 
the status quo (increasingly so as its status as a great power has vanished), 
France has at times favoured a more positive view of small and peripheral 
Eastern European states. On the surface, France’s foreign policy might pro-
vide only a skewed image of the way various elements interact, and render it 
difficult to decipher moments of sudden change. These have to be replaced in 
the general environment of France’s action and completed by way of subtler 
incentives (personal relations, bilateral contacts, culture, networks, a his-
tory of long-term relations, etc.) found in the depths of France’s foreign rela-
tions and political decision-making. To make full sense of rapidly changing 
French policy towards peripheral areas such as the Baltic states and Finland, 
all these elements have to be woven into the narrative. 
Una Bergmane (b. 1985) is a Postdoctoral Fellow at Mario Einaudi Centre for 
International Studies, Cornell University.*
Louis Clerc (b. 1976) is a Professor in Contemporary History at the University 
of Turku, Finland.**
100  11/02/2015 - Paris - Déclaration Officielle - Ukraine - Russie - Entretien de M. Lau-
rent Fabius, ministre des affaires étrangères et du développement international, avec 
France Inter, <http://basedoc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/exl-doc/EPJ00403905.pdf> (accessed 
20 May 2015).
101  Cf. Castelbajac, Gasquet, Soutou, Recherches sur la France, 127–139.
*  Correspondence: Mario Einaudi Centre for International Studies, Cornell University, 
170 Uris Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA. E-mail: una.bergmane@cornell.edu
**  Correspondence: Poliittinen historia, 20014 Turun Yliopisto, Finland. E-mail: 
loucle@utu.fi
396 Ajalooline Ajakiri, 2016, 3/4 (157/158)
Kokkuvõte: Kas ainult “ettevaatlikkus, pragmatism ja künism”? 
Prantsusmaa ja Baltimaade suhted kriisiaastatel (1918–1922; 1988–
1992) 
Prantsusmaa suhted Balti riikide ja Soomega on olnud uurimisobjektiks 
peamiselt geostrateegilistele aspektidele keskenduvatele käsitlustele. Need 
esitavad Prantsusmaa poliitikat kui küünilist ja ettevaatlikku, mis tegeles 
peamiselt Venemaa kui stabiliseeriva jõu toetamisega Baltikumis. Kuid 
siinkohal leiavad käsitlemist ka teistsugused komponendid Prantsuse suh-
tumises neisse väikeriikidesse, pakkudes mitmekesisema pildi Prantsus-
maa Soome ja Balti riikide suunal teostatud poliitikast. See esitatav pilt, 
sealhulgas eriti kumulatiivse iseloomuga ajaloolise mälu ja isiklike võrgus-
tike mõju, kinnitab Prantsuse poliitikas asetleidnud teistsuguseid aren-
guid, mis leidsid väljenduse just kriisiaastatel. Artikkel soovib näidata, et 
kuigi geopoliitiline olukord ja suhted Venemaaga panid paika Prantsuse 
Ida-Balti poliitika üldisema raamistiku, olid selle kõrval olulised ka teised 
aspketid, mida ei tohiks unustada.
